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Abstract
This article investigates the environmental and economic impact of the free allocation of
emissions allowances in Emissions Trading Schemes (ETSs) as well as its compatibility with
trade law. Free allocation can facilitate the industry’s gradual adjustment to an ETS and
hence boost its acceptability. At the same time, however, the article shows that the economic
and environmental beneﬁts of free allocation are debatable. Moreover, the practice of free
allocation possibly contravenes WTO law. The conclusion that free allowances may
constitute an objectionable subsidy under WTO subsidy disciplines raises questions of law
reform. Should the ETS be reformed to ﬁt conventional trade imperatives, or should trade law
be rethought so as to be responsive to contemporary environmental protection strategies?
The article argues that, considering the questionable beneﬁts of free allocation, any adjust-
ment to trade law should be narrow and temporary.
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1. introduction
Emissions trading schemes (ETSs) form a common policy measure intended to reduce
emissions in a cost-effective manner. The most popular and large-scale greenhouse
gas (GHG) scheme is certainly that deployed by the European Union (EU),1 but
signiﬁcant examples can be found in countries such as Norway,2 Switzerland3 or New
Zealand,4 or in sub-national and regional contexts, such as Tokyo (Japan)5 or the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)6 in North America.7
An ETS consists of three main elements: (i) a cap for total emissions from covered
sectors (or a restriction of emissions related to a pre-speciﬁed level of inputs or
outputs); (ii) rights or ‘allowances’ to emit GHGs; and (iii) a market for trading the
allowances. The cost-effectiveness of the scheme relates to the incentives purposely
created to cash in on one’s own efﬁciency in reducing emissions: reductions can be
undertaken where the abatement costs are relatively low, whereas industries with less
favourable abatement opportunities can buy additional allowances on the market.
The fundamental difference between an ETS and any conventional market is that
the amount of allowances available depends directly on governmental decisions. A
central authority estimates emissions for a speciﬁc period of time, sets an overall cap
or an intensity-target below that level, divides this into individual emissions quotas
and distributes corresponding allowances to each trading entity participating in the
scheme.
It is extremely common, at least in the initial phases of an ETS, for emissions
allowances to be allocated, in total or in large part, free of charge. There are several
reasons for this. Introducing a scheme for charging polluters is difﬁcult as it implies
costs for the domestic industry, important actors for domestic growth and employ-
ment. Initially distributing allowances free of charge is a way of introducing the costs
gently, so as to allow the ﬁrms to adjust gradually to the new policy environment
before the administrator moves to other modes of distribution, such as auctioning.
This not only protects the industry from an overly abrupt change in the conditions
1 EuropeanCommission,ClimateAction, ‘Emissions Trading System (EUETS)’, available at: http://ec.europa.
eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm.
2 Ministry of the Environment (Norway), ‘Norwegian National Allocation Plan for the Emissions
Trading System in 2008–2010’, available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/md/documents-and-
publications/reports-and-plans/Plans/2008/norwegian-national-allocation-plan-for-t.html?id5505229.
3 Federal Ofﬁce for the Environment (Switzerland), ‘Emissions Trading in Switzerland’, available at:
http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05538/05540/index.html?lang5en.
4 Climate Change Information (New Zealand), ‘The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme’, available
at: http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme.
5 Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Bureau of the Environment, ‘Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program:
Japan’s First Mandatory Emissions Trading Scheme, Mar. 2010, available at: http://www.kankyo.
metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/Tokyo-cap_and_trade_program-march_2010_TMG.pdf.
6 See http://www.rggi.org.
7 For an overview of some of these schemes, see I. Jegou & L. Rubini, ‘The Allocation of Emission
Allowances Free of Charge: Legal and Economic Considerations’, International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Issue Paper 18/2011, Programme on Competitiveness and Sustain-
able Development, Geneva (Switzerland), Aug. 2011, available at: http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/11/
the-allocation-of-emission-allowances-free-of-charge.pdf.
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under which it operates, but also contributes to fostering acceptance of the scheme.
Other reasons relate to concerns of carbon leakage and distortions in competitiveness.
Carbon leakage refers to the possibility that a unilateral introduction of a carbon cost
will negatively affect the competitive position of the domestic industry in favour of
ﬁrms in countries without a similar carbon cost. Leakage occurs when, following
regulation, emissions are reduced in one country, but are then increased elsewhere
as a result of a relocation of the polluting activity.8
The practice of allocating emissions allowances free of charge raises important
questions. For instance, does free allocation dilute the incentives to reduce GHG
emissions which the ETS should bring about, and is it effective as an instrument to
mitigate competitiveness or carbon leakage concerns? What are the subsidy effects
that this free transfer may have on international trade and competition? This article
seeks to answer these questions on the basis of an economic and legal analysis, with
a special focus onWorld Trade Organization (WTO) law. From a different perspective,
this article mainly poses a question of policy space. How much autonomy do WTO
rules offer to Members in granting free allowances? Is this sufﬁcient? If not, is law
reform necessary? And, if so, what are the key guidelines to which it should adhere?
The question of whether the free allocation of allowances constitutes a subsidy is
also a good case study for outlining some of the features of contemporary problems
in environmental and trade governance, characterized by the novelty of the policy
tools and complexity of policy choices, the paucity of empirical data and the intricacy
of the legal issues.
2. the effect(iveness) of free allowances
Free allowances are a handy tool for policy-makers. As environmental measures go,
they are generally attractive to the industry and, although they constitute an oppor-
tunity cost to the government, they do not involve direct expenditure. At the same time,
however, the difference in government revenue from granting allowances free of charge
or requiring emitters to purchase them can be extremely large.9 The question of whether
the free allocation of allowances is an efﬁcient use of resources is therefore legitimate.
2.1. Are Free Allowances Effective in Reducing GHGs?
It is not the free allocation in itself that can reduce emissions but the carbon cost
imposed through an ETS. An ETS may create incentives for reducing emissions, both
8 As of today, there is limited empirical evidence of carbon leakage: for a summary of empirical ﬁndings,
see P. Wooders & A. Cosbey, ‘Climate-Linked Tariffs and Subsidies: Economic Aspects (Competitive-
ness and Leakage)’, Background Paper prepared for the conference ‘Thinking Ahead on International
Trade’, Graduate Institute, Geneva (Switzerland), 2010, at p. 6, available at: http://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/reser_e/climate_jun10_e/background_paper5_e.pdf.
9 This difference has been estimated to be in the region of billions of dollars per year in the EU or the
United States (US): see P. Wooders, A. Cosbey & J. Stephenson, ‘Border Carbon Adjustment and Free
Allowances: Responding to Competitiveness and Leakage’, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Round Table on Sustainable Development, Paris, 23 July 2009, p. 6, available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/17/43975050.pdf.
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through the actual carbon price it creates and through the signal it sends about the
need for technology change in order to accomplish a shift to a low-carbon economy.
The idea behind allocating emissions allowances free of charge is that the allow-
ances represent an opportunity cost. This implies that – irrespective of the mode
of allocation – the ﬁrms covered by the scheme have an incentive to reduce their
emissions, as they can then sell the excess allowances for proﬁt.10 Nevertheless, there
are numerous complexities underlying this relationship. Firstly, opportunity costs
and actual outlays are two different things and, typically, ﬁrms pay more attention to
the latter. Secondly, ﬁrms with excess allocation (which is more common when
allowances are free) are under little direct pressure to cut emissions at all.11 Thirdly,
particularly in relation to grandfathering,12 there is a risk that if free allocations
continue and industries expect future allocations to reﬂect recent emissions, incen-
tives to reduce emissions in the present will be undermined. Finally, the ability of
contributing to reducing emissions seems to be related to the type of cap. Faced with
absolute caps,13 ﬁrms would always factor the effective cost of carbon into their
production decisions. For ﬁrms with output-based allocation,14 the effective cost
of carbon they face reduces as a function of the allowances they are rebated. The
effective carbon cost could be near zero and ﬁrms would have little incentive to
reduce emissions.15
2.2. Are Free Allowances Effective in Reducing Competitiveness and
Leakage Impacts?
One of the reasons for granting emissions allowances free of charge is to reduce the
risks of distortion in competitiveness and carbon leakage. The starting point is that,
irrespective of permit allocation rules, ﬁrms pass on much of the carbon cost whenever
possible. This is likely to occur even in competitive markets.16 If the allowance has been
received free of charge, passing on the carbon cost to consumers allows ﬁrms to make a
proﬁt.17 Where this occurs, the justiﬁcation for competitiveness or leakage claims is
substantially weakened.
10 A survey of stakeholders carried out in the EU in 2005 indicated that many participants indeed
incorporated the value of allowances in making long-term decisions, particularly in the electric utility
sector: European Commission, Directorate General for Environment, ‘Review of EU Emissions Trading
Scheme: Survey Highlights’, Nov. 2005, pp. 5–7.
11 Data suggest that in the aggregate they have not done so: R.N. Cooper, ‘Europe’s Emissions Trading
System’, The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper, Aug. 2010, p. 9,
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ﬁles/CooperETSﬁnal.pdf.
12 Grandfathering refers to the allocation based on past levels of emissions.
13 Absolute targets for emissions reductions, expressed in terms of emissions.
14 Intensity targets expressed in terms of emissions per unit of output.
15 See Wooders, Cosbey & Stephenson, n. 9 above, at p. 50.
16 R. Smale, M. Hartley, C. Hepburn, J. Ward & M. Grubb, ‘The Impact of CO2 Emissions Trading on
Firm Proﬁts and Market Prices’ (2006) 6 Climate Policy, pp. 29–46.
17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Economics of Climate
Change Mitigation: Policies and Options for Global Action Beyond 2012 (OECD, 2009), at p. 88.
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Assuming a carbon leakage risk exists, Wooders, Cosbey and Stephenson claim
that:
there is little empirical evidence to suggest whether or not free allowances would be
effective. Economic theory strongly suggests that they will have little or no impact in the
short term. In the longer term, little is known about how effective free allowances would
be in encouraging producers to remain in countries with climate change policies and
measures. There must be a strong suspicion that free allowances, which have the nature
of a compensatory payment, will have little impact on competitiveness and leakage.18
Under both intensity-based and output-based caps, rebates of allowances reduce the
effective cost of carbon below the allowance price in the market. This will intuitively
reduce leakage and competitiveness risks but, importantly, will also reduce the
environmental effectiveness of the policy. A low carbon cost reduces the incentive to
abate emissions, thereby leaving the competitive position relatively unaltered.
Thus, the ability of free allocation to reduce the risk for leakage is linked to its ability
to actually create incentives to reduce emissions: if the design is such that there is little
incentive to abate emissions, then the risk of leakage is intuitively negligible, and the
free allocation would not make any signiﬁcant difference in any direction. If, however,
there is an impact on emissions, and thus a risk of leakage, it seems from the above that
it remains unclear whether free allocation would contribute to mitigate that risk.
2.3. Conclusions on the Effectiveness of Free Allowances
Although countries introducing ETSs are likely to use free allocation of allowances, at
least in the initial stages of implementation, it emerges from a preliminary economic
analysis that the effectiveness of free allowances in contributing to reducing emissions,
while reducing the risks for carbon leakage or competitiveness, is at least questionable.
3. free allowances as subsidy: an economic
perspective
Free trade is an important tool to promote economic growth. In an enabling envi-
ronment, it can be a cornerstone in the quest for sustainable development. An analysis
of climate policy measures with possible implications for trade should be seen as
follows: do they support or impede the opportunities for trade to contribute posi-
tively to sustainable development? It is in this context that the question of whether
free allowances may subsidize domestic production, and thereby potentially distort
trade with ﬁrms in other countries, becomes important.
3.1. What is a Subsidy?
However valuable subsidies may be in supporting various policy goals, they are
controversial from a trade perspective as they can interfere with market pricing and
resource allocation decisions, as well as distort comparative advantages.
18 Wooders, Cosbey & Stephenson, n. 9 above, at p. 51.
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From an economic viewpoint, there is no universally accepted deﬁnition of a
subsidy.19 A subsidy could be the ‘result of a government action that confers an
advantage on consumers or producers, in order to supplement their income or lower
their costs’.20 This broad deﬁnition would also cover market price support in the
form of border protection and government infrastructure provided for speciﬁc indus-
tries at less than full cost.
This broad economic deﬁnition is not necessarily identical to any legal deﬁnition
of a subsidy. A subsidy in economic terms may not be such from a legal standpoint,
and vice versa. This is one of the key points that will emerge from the following
analysis.
3.2. Free Allocation as a Potential Subsidy: Six Factors
The following six factors foster the treatment of freely allocated emissions allowances
as potential subsidies.
Financial wealth
Intuitively, a ﬁrm that receives free allowances will be in a stronger ﬁnancial position
than one that has to pay for them. Although free allowances do not (initially) affect a
ﬁrm’s revenues, they reduce the total costs compared with those of ﬁrms that must
purchase allowances or compared with installations that do not enjoy free allocation.21
Over-allocation
Over-allocation means that a ﬁrm is allocated more allowances than it needs to cover
its emissions. Excess allowances may be sold for proﬁt, creating an obvious incentive
for ﬁrms to overstate their needs, thereby avoiding abatement efforts and investments.
The problem is particularly relevant when the allocation is based on grandfathering.
Indeed, both theory and evidence indicate an upwards bias in projection-based
allocations. It is a classic case of information asymmetry: ﬁrms simply know more
about their production, emissions and investment intentions than do regulators.22
19 OECD, Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Challenges for Reform (OECD, 2005), at p. 7.
20 Ibid, p. 16.
21 M. Åhman, D. Burtraw, J. Kruger & L. Zetterberg, ‘The Ten Year Rule: Allocation of Emission
Allowances in the EU ETS’, Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 05-30, June 2005, p. 5, available
at: http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-dp-05-30.pdf.
22 See M. Grubb & K. Neuhoff, ‘Allocation and Competitiveness in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme:
Policy Overview’, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, No. 0645, June 2006, available at:
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/eprg0622.pdf; and J. Stephenson &
S. Upton, ‘Competitiveness, Leakage and Border Adjustment: Climate Policy Distractions?’, OECD,
RoundTable on Sustainable Development, 22–23 July 2009, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
23/20/43441650.pdf.
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When allocation is based on benchmarking23 or on actual output, allowances relate
more directly to real needs and performance.
Over-compensation
Over-compensation occurs when costs are passed on while ﬁrms are being compen-
sated for the carbon costs through free allowances, resulting in ‘windfall proﬁts’. Of
the subsidy elements discussed, the prevalence of windfall proﬁts is the easiest to assess,
as the EU ETS case shows.24 Both over-allocation and over-compensation can be
considered to constitute a net subsidy.25 In both cases, ﬁrms are compensated for costs
they do not in reality incur, without any requirement to actually abate emissions.
Investment subsidy for new entrants
Setting aside allowances for new entrants is attractive to policy-makers for reasons of
equity (treating new entrants and existing plants in the same way) and as a mechanism
to attract new investment. At the same time, free allocation to new entrants can be
considered an investment subsidy.26
Plant closure and production subsidy
Following the logic of a market-based policy instrument, which favours the most efﬁcient
ﬁrms and installations and stimulates the least expensive abatement options, an instal-
lation should retain its allocation even where it reduces economic activity or closes.27
An installation with relatively inferior environmental performance will face relatively
greater costs associated with the use of emissions allowances and should therefore give
way to installations with higher environmental performance. An operator will close an
23 Benchmarking methodology is designed to avoid the negative effects associated with grandfathering.
The principle behind benchmarking is to assess each entity’s emissions efﬁciency against a sector average
using a mathematical formula. Allowances are then distributed based on a benchmark of the most
efﬁcient installations, to create incentives to reduce emissions.
24 A synthesis of much of the empirical evidence on windfall proﬁts from the EU ETS concludes that total
rents have been substantial, even when the carbon price has been modest. All technologies and all
participants included in the EU ETS have beneﬁted from ETS-related rents. See C. Egenhofer, M. Alessi,
A. Georgiev&N. Fujiwara, ‘The EUEmissions Trading System andClimate Policy Towards 2050: Real
Incentives to Reduce Emissions andDrive Innovation?’, CEPS Special Report, 2011, pp. 14–6, available
at: http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/4097. For a helpful discussion of windfalls in the power sector
and in the cement industry, see J. Sijm, K. Neuhoff & Y. Chen, ‘CO2 Cost Pass Through and Windfall
Proﬁts in the Power Sector’, CWPE 0639 and EPRG 0617, May 2006, available at: http://www.eprg.
group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/eprg0617.pdf; F. Gulli (ed.), Markets for Carbon and
Power Pricing in Europe: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Analyses (Edward Elgar, 2009); N. Walker,
‘Concrete Evidence? An Empirical Approach to Quantify the Impact of EU Emissions Trading
on Cement Industry Competitiveness’, University College Dublin, Planning and Environmental
Policy Research Series, Working Paper 2006/10, available at: http://www.ucd.ie/gpep/publications/
archivedworkingpapers/2006/06-10.pdf.
25 See Stephenson & Upton, n. 22 above, at p. 14.
26 M. Grubb ‘The European Emissions Trading Scheme: An Overview of Operation and Lessons’ (2007)
8(4)CESifo Forum, p. 22, available at: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1193136.PDF. In
addition, giving free allowances in proportion to the carbon intensity of new plants can bias the incentives
towards more carbon-intensive investments, something that would not be beneﬁcial to the aim of reducing
emissions. Benchmarking new entrant reserves on the basis of capacity could avoid the worst of distortions.
27 See Åhman, Burtraw, Kruger & Zetterberg, n. 21 above, at p. 12.
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installation and sell the allowances to a more efﬁcient plant if it is proﬁtable to do so, thus
pursuing the efﬁcient solution and fulﬁlling the intended effect of the scheme.
Withholding the free allowance in the case of closure would turn the allocation
into a subsidy to production, as the ﬁrm would have the incentive to keep the instal-
lation open since it earns the allocation if, and only if, it continues to operate.
Sector bias
In Phase II of the EU ETS, the allocation of free allowances was biased in favour of the
manufacturing sector at the expense of power-generating sectors. The rationale was that
the power sector could more easily pass on its increased costs to consumers than could
manufacturing ﬁrms subject to international competition. Although this may be justi-
ﬁable from an economic perspective, this practice was not uniform across countries
and was therefore capable of creating competitive distortions within the EU.28
3.3. The Impact of Free Allowances on Trade
It is difﬁcult to draw general conclusions on the potential impact of free allowances
on trade. Firstly, one rationale behind free allocation is to prevent carbon leakage,
which would occur through variations in trade patterns. Proving the negative is not
easy. Secondly, since ETSs and free allowances are relatively recent policy tools, it is
still too early to evaluate their effects. Thirdly, and crucially, in order to assess the
effects on trade, it would also be necessary to establish the counterfactual for compar-
ison, which is always challenging.
The various subsidy factors outlined above may have different effects on trade. In
general terms, the ﬁrst three (increased ﬁnancial wealth, over-allocation, and over-
compensation), transfer ﬁnancial resources to heavily polluting industries. This could
result in lower product prices, thereby rendering these industries more price competi-
tive on the international market. However, as ﬁrms are inclined to pass costs on,
the development observed has rather been the opposite, showing increased prices
combined with the increased wealth of companies.
Greater wealth may render the recipient ﬁrms better placed to invest in research
and development, marketing, energy efﬁciency, new plants or any other priority that
might increase their market share in the country where they face a carbon cost.29 A
stronger ﬁnancial position would also tend to result in secondary beneﬁts, such as
lower costs of capital.30 All this may, in the long term, lead to a stronger competitive
28 The described problem is in any case likely to be reduced in Phase III of the EU ETS when there will be
increased harmonization in the allocation of emission allowances,mainly following the abandonment of
the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) since the allocation will be decided at the EU level. On the
progressive increased harmonization of the EU ETS, see A. Denny Ellerman, ‘The EU Emission Trading
Scheme: A Prototype Global System?’, The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements,
Discussion Paper, Aug. 2008, available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18488/
eu_emission_trading_scheme.html.
29 Stephenson & Upton, n. 22 above, at p. 14.
30 See Wooders, Cosbey & Stephenson, n. 9 above, at p. 27.
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position, even at the international level, which, in turn, could boost domestic produc-
tion, displace imports and adversely affect other countries. However, demonstrating
that imports are being displaced, and linking such effects to free allocation, is difﬁcult
and will need to be judged on a case-by-case basis.31
The investment subsidy discussed in relation to new entrants could potentially
contribute to inﬂuencing investment decisions, thereby having an impact on trade
patterns. Additionally, the potential bias between countries, where ﬁrms active within
the same sectors are treated differently among countries, could possibly affect trade
patterns as it would be capable of distorting competition.32 The factor relating to plant
closure would risk supporting environmentally and economically inefﬁcient plants
through a production subsidy.
3.4. Conclusions on Free Allowances as Subsidies: Economic Perspective
The foregoing analysis reveals that free allowances involve various factors that, under
the broad economic deﬁnition of subsidy, would warrant their classiﬁcation as
a subsidy. Further empirical analysis is needed to assess whether the risks attached to
the subsidy features identiﬁed above have indeed occurred and whether and to what
extent they have induced distortions to international trade.
4. free allowances as subsidy: a legal perspective
It has already been noted that any assessment on whether the free allocation of
allowances constitutes a subsidy reached through economic analysis cannot be
transposed directly to the legal context. The legal deﬁnition of subsidy in WTO law is
a precise one. The existence of a subsidy depends not (only) on the economic effects
of the conduct of the government but, most importantly, on the positive proof of
certain legal requirements.33 It is therefore important to determine whether and
which of the potential subsidy elements identiﬁed in the economic analysis above
would fall foul of WTO rules and which type of impact on trade must be proved.
In general, the economic concept of subsidy is broader than the legal one, with the
crucial consequence that many more activities are likely to be objected to from
an economic, as opposed to a legal, perspective. As the following analysis shows,
however, there are exceptional cases where economic analysis would conclude that we
cannot really talk of a subsidy, with the legal deﬁnition being stricter.
31 See Stephenson & Upton, n. 22 above, at p. 15.
32 For example, in the EU ETS, there is a lack of harmonization with respect to the allocation of allowances
to new entrants. Research shows that the annual free allocations to a new natural gas combined-cycle
plant would vary from zero allowances in Sweden to as much as allowances worth V11 million in
Germany, at a carbon price ofV10 per ton. SeeM. Åhman&K. Holmgren, ‘New Entrant Allocation in
the Nordic Energy Sectors: Incentives and Options in the EU ETS’, IVL Swedish Environment Research
Institute, Jan. 2007, p. 8, available at: http://www.ivl.se/webdav/ﬁles/B-rapporter/B1710.pdf.
33 The said precision refers to the fact that there are very identiﬁable requirements, not to the conceptual
or practical clarity of those requirements. On the various issues raised by the deﬁnition of a subsidy in
both theWTO and EU, see L. Rubini, The Deﬁnition of Subsidy and State Aid:WTOLaw and EC Law
in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2009).
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It is in the light of the clariﬁcation of the difference between economic and legal
interpretations of subsidy that one must assess Stiglitz’s claim that the failure to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol34 amounts to a ‘negative’ subsidy.35 In reaching this conclusion, he
notes that ‘[a] subsidy means that a ﬁrm does not pay the full costs of production. Not
paying the cost of damage to the environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full
costs of workers would be’.
Stiglitz’s economic language has to be translated into a legal claim and applied
within a determined legal framework, in the instant case that of WTO law.
Article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM)36 provides that a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if there is (i) a ‘ﬁnancial
contribution’ by the government,37 which correspondswith one of the speciﬁc forms of
action indicated therein, or ‘any form of income or price support’; and (ii) this results in
a ‘beneﬁt’. To be actionable in the WTO dispute settlement system, or to be subject to
countervailing duties unilaterally imposed by aggrieved countries, a subsidy also needs
to be ‘speciﬁc’ to certain enterprises or industries38 and produce ‘adverse effects’39 or
material injury.40
We now examine each of these steps, commencing with the deﬁnition of a subsidy.
4.1. Financial Contribution
A ﬁnancial contribution under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM exists if one of the
following is present: a ‘transfer of funds’ (item (i)); ‘governmental revenue that is
otherwise due is foregone or not collected’ (item (ii)); or ‘a provision of goods or
services’ (item (iii)).41 While the free allocation of allowances does not easily ﬁt within
the category of a ‘transfer of funds’, which refers to speciﬁc forms of ﬁnancial support
(such as loans, capital injections and guarantees), it could qualify as either govern-
mental revenue that is foregone, or provision of goods or services.42
34 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto (Japan),
10 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
35 J. Stiglitz, ‘A New Agenda for Global Warming’ (2006) 3(7) The Economists’ Voice, available at:
http://works.bepress.com/joseph_stiglitz/1.
36 Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in force 1 Jan. 1995, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm.
37 Which should be broadly interpreted to cover any ‘public body’, such as a regulatory authority. See
Appellate Body Report,United States –Deﬁnitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China (US – AD/CVD), WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted on 25 Mar. 2011 paras. 282–322.
38 Arts. 1.2 and 2 SCM.
39 Arts. 5 and 6 SCM identify three types of adverse effect: injury, serious prejudice and nulliﬁcation, and
impairment of beneﬁts.
40 Art. 15 SCM. Unless subject to countervailing duty investigation, ‘speciﬁcity’ and a negative impact are
assumed for export subsidies.
41 Item (iv), which covers those cases where the government provides a ﬁnancial contribution indirectly,
mainly through a private body, is not relevant here, since the government normally allocates allowances
itself.
42 See L. Henschke, ‘Going it Alone on Climate Change: ANewChallenge toWTO Subsidies Disciplines –
Are Subsidies in Support of Emissions Reductions Schemes Permissible under the WTO’ (2012) 11(1)
World Trade Review, pp. 27–52, at 30–9.
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Government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone
By not charging for the allocation of emissions allowances, the government is fore-
going revenue for the use of a natural resource that it controls. It is, however, insuf-
ﬁcient to rely on the consideration that the government could in principle have charged
for the use of its resources but has not done so. The crucial issue is whether this revenue
would have otherwise been due. This requires a precise point of reference, the identi-
ﬁcation of a benchmark. As evidenced by theUS – Foreign Sales Corporation (US – FSC)
litigation,43 the ‘otherwise due’ language is ambiguous and requires a complex counter-
factual analysis that ultimately rests on a determination of whether the measure under
examination is a derogation from the norm.44
Relying on the case law on tax matters (US – FSC), Bhagwati andMavroidis reafﬁrm
the prerogative of WTO Members to deﬁne their own environmental policy, for
example, by deciding whether or not to join the Kyoto Protocol.45 Subsidy laws, as
such, do not aim to harmonize environmental policies at the global level by forcing
Members to accept the standards adopted by other countries or requiring them to enter
into an international treaty. For the same reason, it does not seem appropriate to assess
the omission of one government against what other governments do. In the absence of
binding and precise obligations, the simple omission to adopt certain environmental
standards is not in itself a subsidy.
The presence of an international standard only becomes relevant under subsidy
laws if it gives rise to a clear prescriptive norm, one which should be followed as
a matter of law. This norm would be the otherwise due benchmark in our case. If this
baseline required a payment for the allocation of emissions permits, the decision of
a government to allocate allowances free of charge would involve foregoing govern-
ment revenue otherwise due.
There is no international norm that expressly requires such a payment. Neither the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)46 nor any
other international agreement provides an obligation to introduce an ETS. Conse-
quently, they do not indicate whether, where such a scheme exists, allowances should
be auctioned or otherwise sold.
An interesting question is whether one could invoke the polluter pays principle
(PPP), as a general principle of environmental law, at both the international and
domestic levels.47 If the prevailing norm is that those that pollute should be liable, to
43 US – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, DS108.
44 See Rubini, n. 33 above, at pp. 263–74. For a recent discussion on the ‘otherwise due’ test, see Appellate
Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint)
(US – Aircraft), WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted on 23 Mar. 2012, paras. 816 et seq.
45 J. Bhagwati & P.C. Mavroidis, ‘Is Action Against US Exports for Failure to Sign Kyoto Protocol
WTO-Legal?’ (2007) 6(2) World Trade Review, pp. 299–310, at 302–3.
46 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int.
47 This approach is followed in EU state aid law. See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case
C-126/01, Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie v. GEMO SA [2003] ECR I-13769,
paras. 66–71. On the PPP generally, see P. Schwartz, ‘Polluter Pays Principle’, in F. Malgosia and
D. Ong (eds.), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 2010),
pp. 243–61.
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relieve a ﬁrm from paying for its emissions would clearly run counter to this principle.
Using Stiglitz’s language, emissions costs, being costs occasioned by the process of
production, should normally be borne by ﬁrms. This is what the PPP requires.
Assuming one can derive a normative benchmark from the PPP, its precise impact
would depend on the absence of other devices to internalize the costs of GHG
pollution. Accordingly, the PPP would be breached only if the free allocation of
allowances results in an overall and substantial relief from emissions costs. If the
social costs of GHG pollution are internalized by other means, such as regulation or
taxation, the fact that emissions allowances are granted free of charge does not
necessarily involve a lessening of environmental liability.
Alternatively, if the benchmark cannot be derived from a general principle such as
the PPP, it should be found in the speciﬁc legal framework of the ETS. Thus, the
general norm in domestic law with respect to allowances allocation is what needs to
be identiﬁed. Presently, existing ETSs allocate virtually all allowances for free.
However, the fact that at least some allowances are auctioned could possibly conﬁrm
the existence of an ‘otherwise due’ scenario and offer a possible baseline. Further, the
regulatory frameworkmay provide that, at a certain point in time in the future, a larger
share of allowances will be auctioned or otherwise distributed with a charge.48 An
interesting legal question is thus whether this progressive phasing out of free alloca-
tions can help to establish that the current scenario of free allocations is exceptional
and the charge, or price, would be otherwise due. This is not an easy route, as the
natural reading of ‘government revenue otherwise due is foregone’ seems to refer to
what is presently due.
One ﬁnal issue concerns a measure’s classiﬁcation as tax revenue. Item (ii) of Article
1.1(a)(1) of the SCM seems to refer mainly to tax measures.49 In fact, the usual reading
links item (ii) exclusively with tax measures.50 This would mean that a positive conclu-
sion in this case would depend on the possibility of considering the charge for allow-
ances as a tax. However, the language of the law is sufﬁciently broad that one could
alternatively argue that any instance where government (hence, not necessarily ﬁscal)
revenue is foregone is covered by item (ii). If this argument becomes acceptable, and
the ‘otherwise due’ benchmark has been identiﬁed and strayed from, the free allocation
of allowances would constitute a ﬁnancial contribution.
Provision of goods or services
In case one ﬁnds that the allocation of emissions allowances free of charge does not
qualify as a ﬁnancial contribution as deﬁned in item (ii), the same Article 1.1(a)(1) of
the SCM offers one possible alternative. Item (iii) lays down another form of ﬁnancial
48 The EU ETS should be fully based on auctioning by 2027.
49 The example provided is ‘ﬁscal incentives such as tax credits’.
50 The recent ﬁnding of the Appellate Body inUS –Aircraft, n. 44 above, para. 615, which interpreted item
(i) so that ‘the inclusion of speciﬁc examples [. . .] provides an indication of the types of transactions
intended to be covered by themore general reference’, seems to support the limitation of item (ii) to ﬁscal
measures.
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contribution, where the government ‘provides goods or services’.51 Although the
precise characterization of emissions allowances as goods or services does not change
the ﬁnal conclusion, as the SCM applies to both cases, it is interesting to analyze this
classiﬁcation issue in more detail.52
Allowances could be considered as goods. They have economic value, not only
because they can be allocated for consideration (that is, ﬁnancial reward or another
form of economic return), but especially because, if they are not needed to satisfy the
individual cap, they can be traded on the market as securities. Moreover, inasmuch
as securities can be regarded as ﬁnancial instruments, their transfer can be held to
involve ﬁnancial services.53
It could even be asked whether the permission to exploit the atmosphere, which is
in essence what emissions allowances bestow, amounts to the provision of a good,
a natural resource that can be used and subjected to economic transactions.54 An
analogy could here be drawn with the US – Lumber IV dispute,55 in which the
Appellate Body faced the question of whether the permit to harvest lumber on Crown
land of certain Canadian Provinces amounted to a provision of goods under Article
1.1(a)(1)(iii). The counter-argument presented by Canada was that the right to reap
a natural resource could not be equated to the actual, direct provision of the same
resource. The Appellate Body, however, upheld the Panel’s ﬁnding that the grant of
a right to harvest lumber amounts to the provision of a good.56 Reasoning otherwise
would have meant an unduly restrictive construction of the term ‘provide’, which is
open-ended. This ﬁnding is particularly instructive for the present analysis. The free
allocation of emissions allowances is essentially the grant of an entitlement to pollute
a natural resource, namely the atmosphere, which is similar to the grant of a right
to harvest lumber. From this perspective, too, one can suggest that the allocation of
emissions allowances should qualify as a provision of goods under item (iii).
Sound arguments exist, therefore, to conclude that the emissions allowances do
involve the provision of goods and/or services and thereby constitute a form of ﬁnan-
cial contribution under Article 1 of the SCM.
51 The two options are not mutually exclusive; depending on the perspective, an emissions allowance could
constitute a good and a service: see Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas), WT/DS16/AB/R, para. 221.
52 See E. Vranes, ‘Climate Change and theWTO: EU Emission Trading and theWTODisciplines on Trade
in Goods, Services and Investment Protection’ (2009) 43(4) Journal of World Trade, pp. 707–35.
53 Which may engage the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Marrakesh
(Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in force 1 Jan. 1995, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm.
54 R. Howse, ‘Climate Change Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO Legal Framework: A Policy Analysis’,
International Institute for Sustainable Development, May 2010, pp. 12–13, available at: http://www.iisd.
org/pdf/2009/bali_2_copenhagen_subsidies_legal.pdf.
55 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determinations with respect to
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (US – Softwood Lumber IV), WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted on
17 Feb. 2004.
56 Ibid., paras. 57–76. If the beneﬁt analysis of the Appellate Body (see paras. 82–122) is controversial
because contra legem this is not the case for the ﬁnancial contribution analysis outlined in the text.
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4.2. Income Support
According to Article 1.1(a) of the SCM, a subsidy is deemed to exist if there is a ﬁnan-
cial contribution or, alternatively, ‘any income or price support in the sense of
Article XVI of GATT 1994’57 – that is, support ‘which operates directly or indirectly to
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into’ the
territory of the subsidizing country.
This limb of the deﬁnition of a subsidy is relatively unexplored.58 It has been
suggested that it should be limited to support in the agricultural sector.59 However,
because of its broad and open-ended language, this provision has huge potential for
more extensive application and is increasingly referred to, for example, in the context
of policy measures to ﬁght climate change, such as feed-in tariffs.60
Following this line of thought, it could be argued that the free allocation of
allowances is a form of income support, particularly in the form of an increase in
wealth, which may produce an impact on trade.61
4.3. Beneﬁt
To qualify as a subsidy under the SCM, a ﬁnancial contribution or a measure of
income support has to confer a beneﬁt. This requires establishing that the recipient is
‘better off’ than it would have been absent the alleged subsidy.62 Even if the essence of
the beneﬁt conferred by free allowances is undisputed, as is the fact that the recipient
57 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in force
1 Jan. 1995, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm.
58 The only ofﬁcial interpretation by the WTO can be found in the very recent Panel Report, China –
Countervailing and AntidumpingDuties onGrainOriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United
States (China – GOES), decision of 15 June 2012, paras. 783–8.
59 R.W. Staiger & A.O. Sykes ‘“Currency Manipulation” and World Trade’ (2010) 9(4) World Trade
Review, pp. 583–627, at 610 fn. 52. On the history of this language and arguing for a broad
interpretation, see J. Lambert & S. Rueffer, Export Taxes under WTOAgreements, Legal Memo to the
Mexican delegation, 10 June 2010, available at: http://www.graduateinstitute.ch.
60 S.Z. Bigdeli, ‘Incentive Schemes to Promote Renewables and the WTO Law of Subsidies’, in T. Cottier,
O. Nartova & S.Z. Bigdeli, International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 155–92, at 170; Howse, n. 54 above, at p. 14; Rubini, n. 33
above, at pp. 123–5. The recent Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector
(DS 412) and Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program (DS 426) disputes, where
the local content requirement of a Canadian feed-in-tariff system is challenged, may provide the
opportunity to explore the notion of ‘income or price support’.
61 It should be noted that this rests on an interpretation of ‘income support’which may be warranted after
the Panel,China –GOES decision (n. 58 above) which, interpreting the sister concept of ‘price support’,
found that this would involve the government ‘setting and maintaining’ a ﬁxed level, rather than
‘a random change [in price] merely being a side-effect of any form of government measure’: ibid., at
para. 7.86. As noted in section 3.2 above, a free transfer of allowances necessarily increases the ﬁnancial
wealth of the recipient ﬁrm.
62 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada –
Aircraft), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted on 4 Aug. 2000, para. 157.
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ﬁrm does not pay what should be paid (whether a price, a tax or compensation for
damage to the environment),63 what is far less evident is what benchmarks should be
used in actual cases to reach a determination that a beneﬁt has been given and how to
calculate it.
If the free allocation of allowances is determined to entail ‘government revenue
that has been foregone’ (item (ii) of Article 1.1(a)(1)), there is almost certainly a beneﬁt,
since the recipient ﬁrm has spent less than it would have done under normal circum-
stances.64 If, by contrast, the allocation is considered to constitute a provision of goods
or services (as under item (iii) of Article 1.1(a)(1)), the question becomes whether the
allowances would have been available for free under normal market conditions.65
This market determination is a complex task, particularly in the absence of reliable
data owing to the still nascent nature of ETSs, and the risks of having to resort to
constructed baselines focusing on a hypothetical market operator.66 These difﬁculties
would also exacerbate the actual calculation of the beneﬁt which is crucial, for
example, for determining the level of countervailing duties.
The economic analysis has revealed various elements of economic advantage in
the allocation of allowances free of charge. Do they also constitute a beneﬁt from the
legal viewpoint? As noted, the economic and legal interpretations of subsidies do not
necessarily coincide. The beneﬁt determination is a good example of this difference,
with the legal test limiting the kind of measures that could amount to a subsidy.
In some cases, there is accord between economic and legal analysis. If the improve-
ment of the ﬁnancial position of the recipient (ﬁrst element in the economic analysis)
results from the fact that the circumstances of the allocation – and notably its gratuity –
are not in line with normal market conditions, this is a beneﬁt. Similarly, any over-
allocation or over-compensation (second and third elements) which would not occur
in normal market conditions is a beneﬁt.67
In contrast, while the extension of free allocation of allowances to new entrants,
or its withdrawal from closing plants, may constitute a subsidy from an economic
perspective, they are not in themselves subsidies from a legal viewpoint.
63 We leave aside here the more general questions of whether the subsidy is conferring a beneﬁt or is rather
compensating for a disadvantage. For an analysis of these questions, see A.O. Sykes, ‘The Questionable
Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective’ (2010) 2(2) Journal of Legal Analysis,
pp. 473–523. See also Jegou & Rubini, n. 7 above, at pp. 33–4.
64 Rubini, n. 33 above, at p. 263.
65 This marketplace does not seem an absolute benchmark, however. The Appellate Body itself (Canada –
Aircraft, n. 62 above, para. 157) underlined that the marketplace is just ‘an appropriate basis for
comparison’ [emphasis added], thus opening the door to alternative yardsticks.
66 An interesting issue is whether these normal market conditions should refer to an emissions trading
scenariowith full auctioning or, more radically, to a situationwith nomarket-based systems, without an
ETS in place. It appears ‘natural’ to consider existing conditions as normal conditions, thus, conditions
available under the ETS at issue or similar schemes (in the jurisdiction), including the allocationmode of
allowances.
67 Another possible dimension of beneﬁt (albeit an indirect one that may go beyond the current legal
framework of analysis) may come from the economic ﬁnding that free allocation may undermine the
incentives to reduce emissions. In such a case, the advantage derives from the fact that the ﬁrms receiving
free allowances are not only relieved from the costs of the emissions but also from the costs of the
activities and investments necessary to be more efﬁcient in their reduction.
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It is important to remember that the key characteristic of the legal concept of
a subsidy is not simply a transfer of economic resources but rather a transfer of
economic resources which is also an exception to the norm. Legally, the free allocation
of allowances would be a subsidy because its free nature derogates from what would
have normally occurred – an otherwise due tax is not collected, an otherwise due
compensation is not paid, an otherwise due price is not disbursed. Accordingly, if
allowances were given away only to existing plants and auctioned to new entrants,
there would still be a subsidy, but one in favour of incumbents that beneﬁt from free
allocation.68 Similarly, it is not the withdrawal of (free) allowances from closing plants
that is objectionable as a production subsidy, but the allocation of allowances free of
charge in the ﬁrst place. Further, while discrepancies in allocation between different
countries or regions participating in the ETS (for example, with respect to the position
of new entrants) may well distort the market in so far as they affect the investment
decisions of ﬁrms active within the same sectors, this would not necessarily constitute
a subsidy from a legal standpoint. What still must be proved, in the ﬁrst place, is that
the free allocation system operating in a given country derogates from a benchmark
principle of auctioning that generally governs the distribution of allowances in that ETS.
One further example illustrates the scope for a possible discrepancy between the
economic and legal assessment. The bias in favour of certain sectors may be justiﬁed
from an economic perspective because it compensates for various circumstances, but it
is harder to justify legally.69 Whilst a crucial objective of subsidy disciplines is to deter-
mine whether the subsidy confers a competitive beneﬁt, the goal of the beneﬁt analysis is
more limited. It aims to ascertain whether, by virtue of the governmental action, the
recipient of the subsidy ﬁnds itself in a more advantageous position than it was in before
the subsidy. This begs for a counterfactual analysis that operates by reference to a positive
alteration of the status quo. Whether the subsidy only compensates for a disadvantage
or cost, or rather affects the competitive position of the recipient and its relation with
competitors, is an issue that is analyzed subsequently and separately when the actual
effects of the subsidy on trade are determined under the ‘adverse effects’ test.70
4.4. Speciﬁcity
A subsidy is subject to WTO scrutiny only if it is speciﬁc ‘to an enterprise or industry
or group of enterprises or industries’ (Article 2.1 of the SCM).71 Speciﬁcity is a very
68 The scenario is different if there is a clear point in time which signals the passage from a free-of-charge
scenario to a fully auctioning scenario. Old and new production units would thus belong to different
regime periods of the ETS with different prevailing benchmarks.
69 See Jegou&Rubini, n. 7 above, at pp. 33–4, warning against the dangers of charging the beneﬁt analysis
with toomany considerations which potentially extend to every possible positive or negative occurrence
affecting the position of the recipient ﬁrm.
70 See also Henschke, n. 42 above, at pp. 39–43. The possibility of considering any disadvantage or cost in
the context of the beneﬁt analysis, or indeed its calculation under Art. 14 SCM would, in our view,
require a complete redeﬁnition of the law.
71 For a comprehensive exposition of the speciﬁcity test, see Appellate Body Report,US – AD/CVD, n. 37
above, paras. 363–78. As mentioned, if a subsidy is found to be a prohibited subsidy, it is automatically
deemed to be speciﬁc and thus not subject to the speciﬁcity test.
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pliable test that also shows a certain degree of expansion.72 Article 2.1 of the SCM
provides three different principles bywhich to establish speciﬁcity. Speciﬁcity is present
if the measure explicitly limits access to the subsidy to certain enterprises (de jure
speciﬁcity, subparagraph (a)). If the eligibility to the subsidy is governed by ‘objective
criteria or conditions’, there is no speciﬁcity (subparagraph (b)). However, according
to the ﬁnal subparagraph (c), which introduces the notion of de facto speciﬁcity, ‘if
notwithstanding any appearance of non-speciﬁcity resulting from the application of
the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that
the subsidy may in fact be speciﬁc, other factors may be considered’. These factors are:
use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use
by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to
certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the
granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy [footnote omitted]. In applying this
subparagraph, account shall be taken of the extent of diversiﬁcation of economic
activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time
during which the subsidy programme has been in operation. [. . .]
As recently cautioned by the Appellate Body, the speciﬁcity test requires the
concurrent application of the principles outlined in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
Article 2.1.73 This is particularly true in the case of free allocation of allowances in
emissions trading schemes where various considerations can be put forward.
One line of argument could be that the free allocation is not speciﬁc because,
although the ETS has a narrow coverage, the free allowances are accessible to
everyone within the system. However, the mere fact that an ETS applies only to a few
‘certain’ sectors of the economy might sufﬁce to conclude that the allocation of
allowances free of charge, even if applicable to all industries covered by the system, is
sufﬁciently speciﬁc. Although speciﬁcity is a ‘general concept, and the breadth or
narrowness of speciﬁcity is not susceptible to rigid quantitative deﬁnition’ but should
rather ‘modulate according to the particular circumstances of a given case’,74 it seems
that how many sectors of the economy are beneﬁted is not really important if the
subsidy is not ‘sufﬁciently broadly available throughout the economy’.75 It could even
be argued that the subsidy granted through free allowances is already in law (or de
jure) speciﬁc since the laws establishing the emissions trading scheme expressly deﬁne
their scope of application and, in so doing, ‘explicitly limit access to the subsidy’ to
certain enterprises.
72 See Rubini, n. 33 above, Chapter 13, at pp. 359–77.
73 Appellate Body, US – AD/CVD, n. 37 above, para. 371.
74 Panel Report, United States – Subsidies to Upland Cotton (US – Cotton), WT/DS/267/R, adopted on
21 Mar. 2005, para. 7.1142.
75 Ibid. On the interpretation of ‘sufﬁciently broadly available’ (as different from ‘universally available’)
and interpreting selective as ‘sufﬁciently limited’, see Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (US – Aircraft), WT/DS353/R, adopted on
23 Mar. 2012, paras. 7.762 and 7.1237. See also the rather open-ended approach to speciﬁcity in
Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determinations with respect to Certain
Softwood Lumber from Canada (US – Softwood Lumber IV), WT/DS257/R, paras. 7.115–7.122.
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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is no de jure speciﬁcity (perhaps
because the ETS would be fairly advanced and almost universal in its application), it
could be argued that the legislation is not speciﬁc because it ‘establishes objective
criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for’ the free allocation of allowances.
This, however, is a difﬁcult battleground. The terms ‘objective criteria or conditions’
refer to ‘criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favour certain enter-
prises over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application,
such as number of employees or size of enterprise’.76 These represent multiple tests of
impartiality and rationality of an ETS design and, most importantly for this analysis, of
the free allocation of allowances within it. It remains to be seen whether the energy and
carbon emissions intensity – which represents the prevalent common denominator of
the industries eligible for the allocation of allowances free of charge – will be consid-
ered to be a criterion that is not only neutral and impartial but also ‘economic in nature
and horizontal in application’.
Complainants may be successful in challenging the free allocation of allowances if
they prove that one of the circumstances indicating de facto speciﬁcity is present,
namely ‘use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises,
predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large
amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has
been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy’.77 The
fact that this ‘dominance’ test is outlined after the ‘objectivity criteria’, and should
apply whenever the application of the other tests leaves a doubt about the speciﬁcity
of the measure, seems to give pre-eminence to the former over the latter.78 Even in
the case of application of the ETS and the free allocation of allowances across the
board, it remains unavoidable that, because of the distinct factual pattern of carbon
emissions, only certain industries will beneﬁt from the free allocation of allowances.
This, at least according to two of the indicators outlined above (predominant use
and concentration of large part of the subsidy), points to the presence of speciﬁcity.
4.5. Adverse Effects
Speciﬁc subsidies may be actionable if they cause adverse effects to the interests of
other countries. Subsidized imports causing material injury to the domestic industry
of the complaining country may also be subject to countervailing duty actions.
It is worth noting that Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM provide various tests of adverse
effects: (i) injury to the domestic industry;79 (ii) nulliﬁcation and impairment of
beneﬁts, which is essentially the frustration by the subsidy of market access oppor-
tunities that other WTO Members could reasonably expect from tariff concessions;
and (iii) serious prejudice. Article 6 of the SCM deﬁnes serious prejudice in various
76 Footnote 2 SCM.
77 Art. 2.1(c) SCM.
78 Appellate Body, US – Aircraft, n. 44 above, para. 796.
79 The concept of injury applies also in the countervailing duty context.
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ways: (a) displacement or impediment of imports of a like product of another Member
into the subsidizing Member’s market; (b) displacement or impediment of exports of
a like product of another Member from a third country market; (c) signiﬁcant price
undercutting of the subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of
another Member, signiﬁcant price suppression, depression, or lost sales in the same
market; and (d) increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member in
a particular subsidized primary product.
These four tests show that subsidized products may cause harm in different ways.
A common pattern is that the ﬁnancial advantage deriving from the free allocation
translates into production decisions, thereby affecting trade mainly in terms of lower
prices or larger output and thus harming competitors in one of the identiﬁed ways.
However, it is clear that, as currently interpreted by the WTO dispute settlement
system, the law does not always require that all of these separate steps be proven.
Thus, in ‘injury’ cases, an effect on volumes and prices with a connection with the
subsidized imports is generally sufﬁcient. In serious prejudice claims, by contrast,
the analysis seems to rely substantially on the competitive impact of the subsidy,80
following an analytical approach reminiscent of antitrust assessment.81
Clearly, any determination of the adverse impact on trade must be based on the
actual scenario and must take into account various elements of the legal standard
challenged. A case-by-case analysis is thus required. That being said, drawing upon
the economic analysis performed above, we can make a few general observations.
Firstly, free allocation undeniably increases the ﬁnancial wealth of the recipients.
What is not clear, however, is whether this advantage translates into a distortion of
international trade. Subsidy laws are not concerned with mere ﬁnancial beneﬁts but
with competitive beneﬁts – that is, advantages that impact upon the competitive
conduct of recipient ﬁrms; this can thus harm international competition by boosting
domestic production at home or abroad and displacing foreign imports or exports. To
be considered as subsidies, the other economic consequences of free allowances should
also create a competitive beneﬁt. Further, any bias between ﬁrms operating in the same
sector, and active in international trade, is more likely to lead to adverse effects as
compared with a bias between different, and not competing, sectors.
Secondly, the empirical evidence available indicates that ﬁrms receiving free
allowances tend to pass on costs (rather than keeping prices unchanged) with the
result that, at least in the short term, no major trade effects have been detected.
Things may be different in the long term if the noted increase in ﬁnancial wealth
eventually translates into a stronger competitive position, even internationally. Any
impact on production and trade patterns can, however, only be relevant for subsidy
80 See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
(EC –Aircraft),WT/DS316/R; Panel,US –Aircraft, n. 75 above; Appellate BodyReport,United States –
Subsidies to Upland Cotton (US – Cotton), WT/DS 267/AB/R; United States – Subsidies to Upland
Cotton (Art. 21.5 DSU) (US – Cotton 21.5), WT/DS267/AB/RW; European Communities – Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (EC –Aircraft), WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted on 1 June 2011; and
US – Aircraft, n. 44 above. On the various adverse effects tests, see Rubini, n. 33 above, Chapter 14, at
pp. 381–418.
81 See Appellate Body, EC – Aircraft, ibid., and Appellate Body, US – Aircraft, n. 44 above.
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laws if the pertinent tests (of displacement, impediment, lost sales, increase in market
shares, and so on) are satisﬁed. Any claim must be duly substantiated. What is needed
is an empirical investigation on a case-by-case basis.
4.6. Prohibited Subsidies
It cannot be excluded that, in certain cases, the allocation of allowances free of charge
could constitute a prohibited subsidy. Subsidies contingent on – that is, conditional or
dependent on – export performance are prohibited.
The EU ETS offers a good case study. Many sectors on the EU list of carbon
leakage sensitive sectors, which are eligible to receive allowances free of charge, have
been included purely on the basis of their trade intensity as calculated from two
variables: imports and exports.82 The legal discussion would focus on whether there is
an element of contingency. Export contingency is present when the measure generates
the incentive to export in a way that deviates from the normal supply and demand
process.83While there is no doubt that free allowances are granted because of the trade
activity of the recipient, an obvious argument against ﬁnding prohibited subsidy would
be that exports are only one of the two alternative variables to determine trade intensity
and seem to bear an equal weight to imports. High trade intensity, and thus eligibility to
receive free allowances, can be established solely on the basis of high imports.84
4.7. Conclusions on Free Allowances as Subsidies: Legal Perspective
The analysis has shown that the evaluation of free allowances under WTO subsidy
rules does not always match the economic evaluation. If few aspects of economic
advantage resulting from the allocation of allowances free of charge may also even-
tually constitute a subsidy that is objectionable at law, there are important exceptions.
On the one hand, some economic advantages are not relevant for the legal analysis.
On the other hand, contrary to legal analysis, economic interpretation may lead us to
conclude that a measure that simply compensates for a disadvantage is not really a
subsidy – for example, when free allocation allegedly addresses competitiveness or
leakage concerns. Despite these differences, there is substantial scope to treat free
allowances as subsidies that contravene WTO legal disciplines.
The possible ﬁnding that the free allocation of allowances constitutes a subsidy
and that such a subsidy is, in principle, actionable or countervailable under WTO law
82 This follows the deﬁnition of trade intensity adopted in Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Council Directive
96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32, Art. 10a(16): ‘A sector or subsector is also deemed to be exposed to
a signiﬁcant risk of carbon leakage if . . . (b) the intensity of trade with third countries, deﬁned as the
ratio between the total value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports from third countries
and the total market size from the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third countries),
is above 30%.’
83 Appellate Body, EC – Aircraft, n. 80 above, para. 1036 et seq.
84 See Panel, US – Aircraft, n. 75 above, para. 7.1542, which rejected the EC argument that a subsidy
contingent on sales, whether domestic or export sales, does amount to an export subsidy.
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is not, however, the ﬁnal step of the legal analysis. It is important to examine whether
an otherwise objectionable subsidy is justiﬁed on the basis of its policy objectives. In
the absence of speciﬁc subsidy provisions offering a legal shelter (a limited category of
exceptions, also for environmental goals, expired in 1999),85 the inquiry shifts to the
question of whether possible grounds for justiﬁcation exist in the broader WTO legal
system, that is, in otherWTO-covered agreements. The natural candidate is Article XX
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).86
5. the legal justiﬁcation for free allowances:
article xx of the gatt and beyond
The GATT regulates trade in goods. It includes basic disciplines on subsidies (Articles VI
and XVI) and a signiﬁcant set of exceptions. Article XX of the GATT provides the
‘general exceptions’ and has a special relevance for environmental measures.
Article XX of the GATT is a crucial provision for the functioning of the GATT
with a distinct normative value.87 Since its inception in 1947, Article XX has contained
the express recognition of non-trade based values, prominently including the environ-
ment, and the possibility for these values to trump trade under certain circumstances.
Indeed, ‘[t]hese exceptions clearly allow Members, under speciﬁc conditions, to give
priority to certain societal values and interests over trade liberalization’.88 It is for this
special role that Article XX has consistently and increasingly been interpreted broadly.89
5.1. The Applicability of Article XX to the SCM Agreement
Before considering whether free allowances could pass muster of the substantive
requirements of GATT Article XX, it is necessary to answer the preliminary question
of whether Article XX can in fact apply beyond the GATT and, in particular, whether
it is applicable to subsidies regulated by the SCM.
The detailed analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this article.90 The
question, which is gaining in prominence in academic debate and in litigation, remains
unsettled. What, however, can be agreed on is that (i) the current state of the case law
does not allow excluding the possibility that the GATT can be applied outside the
conﬁnes of the agreement itself, and (ii) if it can be extended to other agreements, the
85 Arts. 8 and 9 SCM.
86 See n. 57 above.
87 J. Pauwelyn, ‘US Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of
International Trade’, Nicholas Institute Working Paper NI-WP 2007/02, Duke University, deﬁned the
chapeau as ‘themost important provision in the entireGATTagreement’, available at: http://nicholasinstitute.
duke.edu/climate/policydesign/u.s.-federal-climate-policy-and-competitiveness-concerns-the-limits-and-
options-of-international-trade-law.
88 P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), at p. 616.
89 Ibid, at p. 618.
90 See L. Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement,
Policy Space and Law Reform’ (2012) 15(2) Journal of International Economic Law, pp. 525–79,
at 558–67.
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SCM is a plausible candidate. Hence, the question of whether free allowances-as-
subsidies could be justiﬁed under Article XX of the GATT is relevant.
In the following analysis, we assume that Article XX can apply to subsidies.
5.2. Article XX and Free Allowances
Assuming that Article XX of the GATT can apply to the SCM, it is necessary to
determine whether free allowances could satisfy the various substantive requirements
of this provision.
In the US – Gasoline case, the Appellate Body presented the two-tiered approach
that should be used under Article XX of the GATT.91 According to this test, ﬁrstly,
the existence of a provisional justiﬁcation of the measure at issue will have to be
determined under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX, which includes two
‘exceptions’ with environmental relevance: paragraphs (b) and (g). Paragraph (b)
concerns measures that are ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’,
thus covering not only public health policy measures but also ‘environmental’ ones.
Paragraph (g), on the other hand, refers to ‘measures relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources’.92
Secondly, if the existence of a provisional justiﬁcation is established, it must then
be determined whether the measure is applied in conformity with the chapeau, which
reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures.
While the analysis of the exception focuses on the measure itself, under the chapeau it
is the application of the measure that is under scrutiny.
In its early case law, the Appellate Body showed that Article XX is about balancing
the ‘general rule’ that is breached and the ‘exception’ that is invoked as a defence.93
There truly is a ‘weighing and balancing exercise’ of different values that are central
to the operation of this provision in each of its steps.94 This is the typical hermeneutic
process of general clauses where the protection of different values has to be assessed
on a case-by-case basis.95
91 Appellate Body,United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US –Gasoline),
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996, p. 20.
92 Although partly overlapping, the focus of the two exceptions differs slightly.
93 Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, n. 91 above, at pp. 16–7.
94 P. Eeckhout, ‘The Scales of Trade: Reﬂections on the Growth and Functions of the WTO Adjudicative
Branch’ (2010) 13(1) Journal of International Economic Law, pp. 3–26.
95 This process does not necessarily require a precise cost–beneﬁt analysis, but what is, in substance,
a proportionality assessment. An informative taxonomy of ‘trade-off’ adjudicative ‘devices’ can be
found in J.P. Trachtmann, The Economic Structure of International Law (Harvard University Press,
2008), at pp. 222–3.
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Environmental justiﬁcations
Several objectives are put forward in justiﬁcation of the practice of free allocation of
allowances: defensive goals (competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns), proactive
objectives (supporting efforts to reduce GHGs) and political purposes (increasing
the acceptability of the costs of emissions reduction efforts and attempts to ease the
industry’s adjustment process to participation in ETSs).
If we apply Article XX of the GATT to the premise that the allocation of
allowances free of charge is an actionable or even prohibited subsidy, there are two
possible lines of defence that both revolve around the alleged environmentalmerits of
free allocation.96 The ﬁrst argument would rely on the contribution of free allocation
to the reduction of GHG emissions. However, the previous economic analysis shows
that, at best, free allowances are as efﬁcient as paid allowances when regarded as
opportunity costs. At worst, they may diminish the incentives to reduce emissions,
thus going squarely against the proposed aim of emissions trading schemes. The
second argument would rely on the prevention of carbon leakage as a justiﬁcation.
This seems to be the most logical line of defence and will therefore be analyzed for
its merits below.97
The Appellate Body has already found in Brazil – Retreated Tyres that paragraph
(b) on, inter alia, public health could also cover climate change.98 Proof of the meas-
ure’s contribution towards tackling climate change through preventing carbon leakage
would not be enough because it is likely that some evidence of the contribution of the
measure to the protection of human, animal or plant life or health speciﬁcally is also
required.99 This does not seem to pose a real problem though, as there is abundant
evidence of the detrimental effects of climate change on, for example, biodiversity.
That being said, what the necessity test of paragraph (b) ultimately requires is the
balancing of the environmental objective pursued and the contribution of the measure
to that objective, on the one hand, with the restrictions on trade, on the other.100
Althoughmitigating climate changewould certainly represent an important objective –
thus lowering the standard of proof – some tangible evidence of how the measure
contributes to this objective must always be put forward. This means, in this case, that
it will have to be shown both that the free allocation of allowances contributes to
96 Competitiveness claims, based on the disadvantage or cost ensuing from participation in the ETS, do not
seem to be directly relevant under Art. XX GATT. Similarly, political considerations do not easily ﬁnd
space in the assessment.
97 It should be noted that measures addressing carbon leakage cannot be held to be extraterritorial and
thus raise issues of availability of the Art. XX defence. It is in the nature of GHG emissions that,
although produced locally, their effects are felt everywhere.
98 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting the Imports of Retreated Tyres (Brazil – Retreated
Tyres), W/DS332/AB/R, adopted on 17 Dec. 2007, para. 151.
99 See Panel Report, Measures Affecting the Imports of Retreated Tyres (Brazil – Retreated Tyres),
W/DS332/R, adopted on 17 Dec. 2007, para. 7.46, in which it is noted that a party invoking an
environmental justiﬁcation under Art. XX(b) GATT ‘has to establish the existence not just of risks to
“the environment” generally, but speciﬁcally of risks to animal or plant life or health’.
100 The current interpretation of the necessity test is a ‘weighing and balancing exercise’ where a consider-
able degree of deference is given toMembers, particularly with respect to the level of protection decided:
see Appellate Body, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, n. 98 above, para. 178.
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preventing carbon leakage, and that preventing leakage indeed contributes to
addressing climate change. Crucially, the Appellate Body has acknowledged that the
contribution of certain environmental measures, like climate change measures that
often operate within a comprehensive set of policy actions, cannot be evaluated in
the short term, but only with the ‘beneﬁt of time’.101 Further, a key point of the
necessity test analysis is also the determination of whether less trade-restrictive alter-
natives to achieve the same aim are available, but, importantly, these should be
reasonably available, a qualiﬁcation that adds to the deference to the country adopting
the measure.
Even assuming that the country at issue aims for a very high level of environ-
mental protection, it is clear that both the case of carbon leakage and the contri-
bution of free allowances to addressing it should be properly substantiated. We
recall, however, from the economic analysis above, that there is no strong evidence
to support claims of carbon leakage. Further, the extent to which preventing carbon
leakage contributes to mitigating climate change is not apparent. Carbon leakage
will never completely offset the emissions reductions achieved by the emissions
trading scheme. Moreover, and more generally, a global restructuring of production
might be necessary to mitigate climate change in the most effective manner, and such
restructuring would entail carbon leakage.
It should further be taken into account that, by reducing the effective cost of
carbon below the market price, the free allocation of allowances may reduce leakage
risks but, at the same time, may paradoxically reduce the incentive to abate
emissions.102 This effect casts doubt on the rationality of free allocation of allowances
inasmuch as it ultimately undermines the key goal of the ETS of which they are an
integral part.
Although the ‘relating to’ test is lower than the ‘necessity’ test,103 broadly analo-
gous considerations can be made if the paragraph (g) exception is considered.104
The chapeau of Article XX GATT
Assuming the applicability of one of the exceptions and following the two-tier
approach set out in US – Gasoline, the objectives of the measure are not only consid-
ered in the ﬁrst step of the analysis of ArticleXXof theGATT, but also in the second step
where the measure’s application is considered under the chapeau. The chapeau requires
an analysis of the ‘causes and the rationale of the discrimination’.105 A measure may
ultimately be justiﬁed only if it is applied in line with its legitimate objective.
101 Ibid.
102 This may happen in systems with intensity-based or output-based caps alike. See Part 2 above.
103 See Appellate Body Report,United States – Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products
(US – Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 Nov. 1998, para. 141 for the ‘relating to’ language.
104 Importantly, the Appellate Body inUS –Gasoline (n. 91 above, at p. 18) concluded that clean air can be
protected under this exception.
105 Appellate Body, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, n. 98 above, para. 225.
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What the chapeau proscribes is arbitrary and unjustiﬁable discrimination with
regard to how themeasure is applied, not discrimination per se (which, as the Appellate
Body recently noted, is already assessed at the level of the exceptions).106 Further, this
discrimination should be established ‘between countries where the same conditions
prevail’, not only between different exporting countries but also between importing
and exporting countries.
Importantly, the Appellate Body has established that the phrases ‘arbitrary discrim-
ination’, ‘unjustiﬁable discrimination’ and a ‘disguised restriction on international
trade’ impart meaning to one another and serve the same purpose of preventing abuse
and illegitimate use of the exceptions.107 For the current analysis, this means that these
phrases and their consistency with the measure at issue do not have to be discussed
separately.
Case law offers more concrete criteria to assess whether the application of a
measure is in line with the chapeau. Three important ‘groups’ of criteria will be
discussed here. Firstly, the Appellate Body has stressed the importance of applying
a measure that allows for an inquiry into its appropriateness regarding the conditions
prevailing in exporting countries.108 As such, it is crucial that a measure provides ﬂexi-
bility, by accepting comparable measures abroad as a basis for exempting countries
from the application of the trade-restrictive measure.109 Secondly, the requirements of
‘due process’ and fairness have been taken into account under the chapeau.110 It is
important that, in the application of the measure, decisions are taken with the use
of objective and transparent criteria.111 Thirdly, to comply with the chapeau, it is vital
that the means of international cooperation are adequately explored and good faith
efforts have been made to negotiate an international agreement.112
The phrase ‘between countries where the same conditions prevail’ can be of great
importance in the context of climate change measures, as shown by the following two
examples. Firstly, there is a question of whether the notion of ‘prevailing’ conditions
is in conﬂict with the UNFCCC113 principle of common but differentiated respon-
sibilities that allows different reduction commitments, and thus different treatments
on the basis of historical – not prevailing – conditions. The second example relates to
the need to provide ﬂexibility in the application of a measure, as established by case
law. In the application of the measure, it is important to ensure that it is not ‘closed’
106 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines
(Thai –Cigarettes),W/DS371/AB/R, adopted on15 July 2011, para. 177,which (in the context of item (d)
of Art. XX GATT) noted that what has to be necessary is the ‘differential treatment’ of the measure.
107 Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, n. 91 above, at pp. 22–3.
108 Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, n. 103 above, para. 165.
109 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products
(Article 21.5 DSU) (US – Shrimp 21.5), WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted on 21 Nov. 2001, para. 144.
110 See, e.g., Appellate Body, US – Shrimp, n. 103 above, paras. 180–1.
111 Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries (EC – Tariff Preferences), WT/DS246/R, adopted on 20 Apr. 2004, paras.
7.228–7.229.
112 See Appellate Body,US –Gasoline, n. 91 above, at p. 29; and Appellate Body,US – Shrimp 21.5, n. 109
above, paras. 132–4.
113 N. 46 above.
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but is instead ‘open’ to comparable policy measures of other countries, one of the main
lessons of the US – Shrimp litigation.114 In the case of emissions trading schemes, it is
key to ensure a transparent, non-discriminatory and well-designed ‘linking’with other
schemes, or, in their absence, with other policy measures that aim to achieve the same
objective of emissions reduction. The legality of various national climate policy
measures may eventually depend on this. The practical difﬁculties in determining and
comparing the effectiveness of different regulatory systems and tools may be consid-
erable, but attempts towards this end need to be made. Good faith efforts and practical
cooperation between countries in this respect may constitute an additional factual
element helping to ensure the WTO consistency of the measure and, more radically,
may contribute to creating a positive international environment for ongoing efforts
to respond to the climate change challenge.
The fact that the EU ETS legislation limits the possibility of concluding linking
agreements with countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol that have ratiﬁed
the Protocol115 could impede a justiﬁcation under Article XX of the GATT. The
chapeau clearly requires equal treatment in the application of the measure of countries
‘where the same conditions prevail’. On the other hand, failure to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, the most important international climate change agreement, is a signiﬁcant
legal, political and environmental condition that could ultimately allow a difference in
treatment. The limitation, which excludes those countries that have not ratiﬁed the
Kyoto Protocol, is intended to exercise political pressure on them to do so.116
Bhagwati and Mavroidis have noted the possible relevance of the principle
established by the Appellate Body in EC – Tariff Preferences,117 though this did not
concern the chapeau discussion directly.118 In this case, the granting by the EU (then
European Communities – EC) of preferences to developing countries was conditioned
on the adoption of anti-drug production policies. The Appellate Body concluded that
discriminatory preferences areWTO consistent if they are based on ‘objective criteria’.
Applying this argument in the context of climate change, the signing of the Kyoto
Protocol may well be considered to be an objective criterion to discriminate between
countries. At the same time, however, simple reliance on the signing of an interna-
tional agreement – without considering the policy measures adopted at the domestic
level – may be unreasonable. If there is an emissions trading scheme that could be
linked to the EU ETS, then this other country is, irrespective of any international
commitment, undertaking climate change measures. Excluding such a country from
114 It has been noted that this introduces in the chapeau of Art. XX GATT ‘an “embryonic” and “soft”
requirement onMembers to recognize the equivalence of foreign measures comparable in effectiveness’:
see Van den Bossche, n. 88 above, at p. 645; G. Marceau& J.P. Trachtmann ‘AMap of the WTO Law
of Domestic Regulations of Goods’, in G.A. Bermann & P.C. Mavroidis (eds.), Trade and Human
Health and Safety (Cambridge University Press: 2006), pp. 9–76, at 42.
115 Art. 25 of Directive 2003/87/EC, n. 82 above.
116 R. Howse & A.L. Eliason, ‘Domestic and International Strategies to Address Climate Change: An
Overview of the WTO Legal Issues’, in Cottier, Nartova & Bigdeli, n. 60 above, at pp. 48–94, at 58.
117 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries (EC –Tariff Preferences), WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted on 20 Apr. 2004.
118 Bhagwati & Mavroidis, n. 45 above, at pp. 306–7.
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the EU ETS would not seem to be justiﬁable.119 This would not make any environ-
mental sense; neither, under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, would it make
sense from a trade law perspective.
Even though linking an emissions trading scheme is indeed a way of recognizing
foreign climate change mitigation efforts, the important question remains whether the
free allocation of allowances speciﬁcally also takes into account foreign mitigation
efforts. The problem is that free allowances can be allocated only to those installa-
tions participating in the emissions trading scheme. Consideration of comparable
efforts is further restricted by the fact that, in contrast to border measures (which can
selectively target the exports from highly emitting economies and sectors), it would be
more difﬁcult to shield ﬁrms in foreign countries from the effects of subsidies like free
allowances on the basis of their mitigation efforts and resulting carbon prices. In this
sense, it could be very difﬁcult for a country to bring the allocation of free allowances
in line with the chapeau of Article XX.
Additionally, in order for a validation under the chapeau to be possible, it is
important that allowances are not allocated for free without an inquiry into other
ways of tackling carbon leakage through the means of international negotiations and
cooperation. In other words, automatically resorting to free allocation without
showing any attention to the broader picture of international policy and discussions
with trading partners on the issue may lead to the conclusion that the differential
treatment inherent in subsidization is arbitrary and not justiﬁed. Lastly, it would be
important that the criteria used to determine the beneﬁciaries of the free allocation of
allowances, and those used to determine the amount of allowances allocated free of
charge, are transparent and objectively applied.
In conclusion, the case that free allowances could be justiﬁed by Article XX of the
GATT is tenuous. As the economic analysis shows, the free allocation of allowances
does not emerge as instrumental to reducing GHG emissions and tackling carbon
leakage. This substantially means that, from a legal perspective, it is difﬁcult to
consider them as ‘necessary’, or even ‘related to’ these important objectives. Allocating
allowances for free does not seem to be justiﬁable from the environmental viewpoint,
which is the one taken by Article XX. Further, even if grounded, competitiveness
concerns, or political reasons linked to increasing the acceptability of ETSs, cannot ﬁnd
any shelter under the exceptions of Article XX of the GATT.
5.3. Looking into the Future: A New Justiﬁcation?
The preceding analysis reveals that the allocation of allowances free of charge is not
only legally controversial but also environmentally and economically questionable.
119 This seems indeed the rationale of the newly introduced Art. 25.1a of Directive 2003/87/EC, n. 82
above, which allows for agreements on the recognition of allowances of ‘compatible mandatory
greenhouse gas emissions trading systems with absolute emissions caps established in any other country
or in sub-federal or regional entities’. What remains to be seen is whether this amendment eliminates
possible claims of bias. One factor that could lead to controversy is the limitation of the linking to ETSs
with absolute caps only.
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To be sure, empirical evidence may emerge to support their desirability towards the
goal of mitigating climate change. For now, however, it seems to be mainly a political
economy argument that provides support for this practice. Undoubtedly, pending the
quest for a global solution,120 the economic value of free allocation may be a useful
bargaining chip to win the consensus of reluctant industries in the adoption of an ETS
(being one of the less troublesome unilateral actions to mitigate climate change) and,
thus, accommodate any real or alleged competitiveness risks.
Even accounting for this political beneﬁt, the questionable economic and environ-
mental merit of free allocations indicates that, should the path of law reform be
followed, attempts to structure a legal shelter for acceptable forms of free allowances
should be narrowly constrained and temporary.
In this regard, various circumstances shaping both the approach to and the
content of the justiﬁcation should be considered. Firstly, the competitiveness and
carbon leakage concerns that are behind the allocation of allowances free of charge
are, to a large extent, dubious and are not currently supported by strong empirical
evidence. Secondly, free allocation clashes with important environmental policy
principles, such as the ‘polluter pays principle’, and causes undesirable effects like
windfall proﬁts. Further, it may inhibit the incentives of an emissions trading scheme
to function as efﬁciently as they would if allowances were charged.
In the light of these circumstances, the following principles may inform a prospec-
tive legal justiﬁcation:
(a) an express statement that auctioning is the rule and free allocation the exception
should be included. This important afﬁrmation would guide the interpretation of
the speciﬁc conditions of the justiﬁcation andwould further constitute a signiﬁcant
benchmark in determining the existence of a subsidy in the ﬁrst place;
(b) the balance underlying the justiﬁcation and its conditions should be informed
by the principle of sustainable development, as included in the Preamble to the
WTO Agreement. This would, for example, require that the design and appli-
cation of the measure are such as to effectively create incentives to reduce GHG
emissions. Moreover, it would require the legal justiﬁcation to be aligned with
the fundamental policy criterion that the polluter should pay and with the
environmental objective of ETS mechanisms, namely, the reduction of GHG
emissions; and
(c) given their exceptional character, the justiﬁcations should be temporary and
carefully designed. The timing and modalities for the phasing-out of the free
allocation should be clearly set. In addition, the justiﬁcations for free allocation
(carbon leakage and distortions in competitiveness) should materialize in
speciﬁc provisions, providing or requiring plausible proof in terms of harm or
threat of harm to the domestic industry or the environment.
120 For some suggestions, see G.C. Hufbauer, S. Charnovitz & J. Kim, Global Warming and the World
Trading System (Peterson Institute of International Economics, 2009); P. Aerni et al., ‘Climate Change,
Human Rights and International Economic Law: Exploring the Linkages between Human Rights,
Trade and Investment’ (2010) 53 German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 139–88.
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6. some conclusions
Although more empirical analysis of the impact of ETSs and free allowances is
necessary, it is fair to conclude that the allocation of free allowances is problematic –
from an environmental, economic and legal perspective. Their environmental effec-
tiveness is unclear. In fact, free allowances risk reducing the environmental beneﬁts of
an ETS. Further, there are doubts as to whether they have an impact on competitiveness
and leakage. In this article,we have focusedmainly on the question ofwhether allocating
emissions allowances free of charge could constitute a subsidy. The economic and legal
analyses have both shown that this is a distinct possibility, and international trade and
competitionmay be harmed by such a practice. For this reason, there is substantial scope
to treat free allowances as subsidies that are objectionable under WTO subsidy rules.
At the same time, however, ETSs can be important tools for mitigating carbon
emissions, and including features to avoid carbon leakage may be rational from an
environmental and economic perspective. ETSs are becoming increasingly common,
and with them the allocation of allowances free of charge. Even assuming that
leakage risk is not substantial, or that free allowances are not instrumental in reducing
this risk, the practice of distributing allowances free of charge has many advantages.
It is acceptable to the concerned industry, it does not impose direct costs on the
government, and it is not as provocative to third countries as other options to address
carbon leakage or competitiveness concerns. Such measures may be necessary in
order for countries to move ahead with unilateral action to mitigate climate change,
which, in the absence of a global policy framework, is indeed desirable. As the
current row on the extension of the EU ETS to international aviation shows,
unilateral action naturally raises frictions.121 This supports the argument that those
that are less contentious, like free allowances, should be supported.
In this context, important political choices are to be made. Should the ETS be
reformed to ﬁt conventional trade imperatives, or should trade law be rethought to
be responsive to contemporary environmental protection strategies? It might be
worthwhile to consider developing a best practice of emissions trading schemes and,
in particular, of free allowances in order to draw lessons from the recent experiences
and to optimize the beneﬁts for sustainable development and climate change miti-
gation, while reducing the potential negative impact on trade. From a trade law
perspective, there is also a good case to provide a legal shelter for otherwise objec-
tionable free allowances. In this regard, it has been noted recently how the status quo
favours complainants, and ‘distributive justice between Members is likely to be
skewed in favour of the complaining Member’.122 In the absence of speciﬁc subsidy
justiﬁcations, Article XX of the GATT is a tenuous and certainly troublesome route
of justiﬁcation. Law reform appears to be the only alternative. In the light of the
121 See ‘Opponents of EU Aviation Carbon Law Agree on Possible Countermeasures’ (2012) 16(7) Bridges
Weekly Trade News Digest, pp. 1–2; A. Hertogen, ‘Sovereignty as Decisional Independence over
Domestic Affairs: The Dispute on Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading System’ (2012) 1(2)
Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 281–301.
122 Henschke, n. 42 above, at p. 51.
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questionable economic and environmental merit of free allocation, however, any
attempt to legally structure acceptable forms of free of charge allowances should be
narrowly constrained and temporary.
Analyzing the question of whether the allocation of allowances free of charge
constitutes a subsidy outlines some of the features of contemporary problems in
climate change governance. Firstly, complex challenges like climate change rely on
the choice and synergy of policy measures the effectiveness of which is often difﬁcult
to test because of their novelty and the paucity of empirical data. Secondly, the
policy justiﬁcations for these measures are various, not always fully grounded, and
sometimes in contradiction with each other. Thirdly, global problems like climate
change need to be addressed at various levels, and the multi-level responses need to be
connected with each other. The regulation of emissions allowances can be found at
domestic, regional and international levels. For this reason, the question of whether
the free allocation of allowances is efﬁcient and legal, or rather distorting and
questionable from a WTO perspective, ultimately interrogates, from an economic,
environmental and trade standpoint, how different systems interact with each other.
Fourthly, the novelty and complexity of the issues test prevailing tools and rules to
their limit, raising intricate questions of interpretation and exposing deﬁciencies
which highlight the need for dialogue that explores a common understanding of the
needs and priorities of trade rules with respect to climate change.
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